US aid cuts won\u27t hit Pakistan where it hurts by Rakisits, Claude
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Rakisits, Claude 2011, US aid cuts won't hit Pakistan where it hurts, The conversation. 
 




Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner 
  
Copyright : 2011, The Conversation Media Group 




15 July 2011, 2.09pm EST
Claude Rakisits
Associate Professor in Strategic Studies at Deakin University
DISCLO SURE STAT EM ENT
Claude Rakisits does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any
company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.
Washington’s decision last
week to suspend $800 million
in military aid to Pakistan
should not have come as a




it is difficult to see what the
US will gain from such a
move.
The Pakistani leadership has
expressed concern over US actions and the head of Pakistan’s intelligence services is now
heading to Washington for high-level talks, but the prognosis remains poor for the relationship
between the two countries.
Since early this year, the Obama administration has shown publicly that it is unhappy with
Islamabad. This is for a number of reasons but two have been pivotal in the significant
deterioration of bilateral relations. One was the arrest in January of a CIA contractor,
Raymond Davis, following the fatal shooting of two Pakistanis in Lahore. And the second was
the discovery that Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, had been holed up for the last five
years in an expensive, large villa only some 50 kilometres from Islamabad.
Both these issues were eventually resolved to Washington’s satisfaction: Davis was released
for about $2 million of “blood money” and bin Laden was eliminated in an operation conducted
by a US Navy SEAL team in May. Although both matters have been settled, the events soured
the relationship.
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In addition to these two issues, there have been other irritants in the relationship. As a sign of
displeasure with the Americans’ failure to forewarn them of the imminent assassination
operation against bin Laden, the Pakistani authorities had over 100 military trainers leave the
country. Since then, Islamabad has also made it more difficult for US intelligence and military
personnel to obtain entry visas.
Along with these problems, there has been another important source of conflict – Pakistani
political leaders want the US strikes by the unmanned drones against al-Qaeda and Taliban
operatives hiding in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan to stop immediately.
The American administration has made clear this will not happen. These strikes have been
highly successful in eliminating hundreds of terrorists, including Pakistani Taliban militants but
they have also caused many civilian casualties. These civilian deaths have been the single,
most important factor in fuelling the rampant anti-Americanism on the streets of Pakistan.
Finally, another irritant has been the Obama administration’s insistence that the Pakistani
military launch operations against the Haqqani Network – a particularly nasty and efficient
Afghan Taliban group, hiding in North Waziristan.
Having already lost more men fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists in the tribal areas than
the Coalition forces have in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military has no appetite for such an
operation. And critically, the army does not want to hunt down the Haqqani network because
that group has helped them fight other anti-government Pakistani Taliban forces.
It’s important to note that of the $800 million in aid cuts, which represents about a third of the
annual $2 billion in US military aid to Pakistan, about $300 million of it comes from the
Coalition Support Fund (CSF).
This fund is designed to reimburse Pakistan for deploying more than 100,000 troops in the
tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The rest of the funds are for equipment and
training. So whilst withholding CSF money will hurt the Pakistani budget, this will not be
enough to have Pakistan cave in to American demands.
There are two fundamental reasons why the Pakistani authorities will not cut their ties with
some of the militants groups nor go into North Waziristan.
First, whilst it would undoubtedly be in the long-term interests of Pakistan to cut loose these
militant groups, it would be political suicide to do so now. The military and the Pakistan
government are already facing a lot of criticism for appearing too pro-American.
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After a decade of publicly siding with the US in the War on Terror and losing some 3,000
soldiers in the tribal areas, there is a real sense of American betrayal in Pakistan, particularly
after the unilateral raid on bin Laden. Although there does seem to be a little sympathy from
the Pakistani public for Americans when they discovered that bin Laden had been hiding so
close to Islamabad for all those years.
Secondly, there is actually no incentive for the Pakistani military to go hunting down the
Haqqani network in North Waziristan. By admitting that they are involved in behind-the-scenes
negotiations with the Taliban and that the security of Afghanistan will be turned over to Kabul
by the end of 2014, the Americans have effectively admitted strategic defeat in Afghanistan.
Moreover, the lack of incentive has been re-enforced after Lt.Gen David Rodriguez, the
deputy commander of US forces in Afghanistan, who stated on 1 February that if the Pakistani
army did not go into North Waziristan this would not mean “mission failure” in Afghanistan.
Accordingly, given that it would appear that the Haqqani Network – or at least elements of it –
will probably eventually be part of a peace deal in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military is
unlikely to want to make enemies with them at this stage in the game.
So at the end of the day, it is not quite clear what Washington is hoping to achieve by
withholding this military aid, except send a message of displeasure with Pakistan’s behaviour.
But surely, Washington would know that the Pakistani military will not move on the two issues
that matter most to Islamabad.
The Obama administration is, of course, in a position to put much more pressure on Pakistan
where it hurts, including making it difficult for Islamabad to get additional vital loans from the
IMF needed to prop up the decrepit state of the economy. But given the crucial role Pakistan
will play in a post-Coalition Afghanistan, does Washington really want to weaken even further
this geo-strategically important nuclear-armed state?
Two and half years ago, the Obama administration stressed that its priority was to fix the “trust
deficit” between the US and Pakistan. It appeared genuine to want to do so. Unfortunately the
score card today is not good.
Washington will need to change diplomatic tack because the bottom line is this: it would be in
no one’s interest for this bilateral relationship to get worse, especially at this crucial moment in
the lead up to the Coalition’s departure from Afghanistan in 2014.
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